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Introduction
Banks are key players in the financial sector which is the backbone of any economy 
(Chockalingam, Dabadghao, & Soetekouw, 2018; Jha & Hui, 2012). Banks as finan-
cial intermediaries transfer financial resources across time and space, that is, they 
connect, in every financial system, surplus-spending units to deficit-spending units 
through the creation of financial assets and liabilities (Ariccia & Marquez, 2004; 
Scannella, 2012). They are keyed to every developmental activity in the developing 
economies by serving as a major source of finance for the majority of firms and main 
depository of economic savings (Arun & Turner, 2004).The fact that banks hold large 
share of economic activities of any country (Jha & Hui, 2012) is a sufficient rationale 
for making their activities sustainable via ensuring their financial soundness.
The sound banking sector and the monetary mechanism play a significant role in 
the development of a nation (Misra & Aspa, 2013). This means that sound financial 
health of banking industry is an assurance not only for the safe custody of deposi-
tors’ fund but equally significant for all stakeholders alike: shareholders and other 
investors; employees; and the whole economy. During an adverse economic condi-
tion, the threat to the going concern of a sound and profitable bank is insignificant 
(Athanasoglou, Brissimis & Delis, 2008). As a matter of fact, a healthy banking sec-
tor and a robust economy are inseparable. In Nigeria, activities of corporate entities 
from formation to liquidation are governed by Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) Cap C20 Law of Federation (LFN) 2004 as amended. Banks and other fi-
nancial institutions, given their importance, are not only required to comply with the 
provisions of CAMA, but are further mandated to comply with Banks and Other Fi-
nancial Institutions Act (BOFIA) Cap B2 LFN 2004, prudential guidelines and other 
directives and circulars as issued by their regulator- Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).
Banking stands out among the most regulated industries in the world (Santos, 
2001). In the regulation of banks, all-encompassing importance is attached to the 
banks’ capital. The strategic importance of capital in the bank management cannot 
be overemphasised (Scannella, 2012). There is evidence in the literature that capital 
generally accounts for a small percentage of the financial resources of banking in-
stitutions, but it plays a crucial role in their long-term financing and solvency posi-
tion and therefore in public credibility (Barrios & Blanco, 2000). The golden value 
assigned to banks’ capital makes its regulation have international touch (Scannella, 
2012), although compliance is monitored and ensured by central banks of various 
jurisdictions. Capital plays a dual-role of investment function and insurance func-
tion in the banking sector meaning that their long-term investment is covered and 
stabilising their economic and financial results becomes easier (Scannella, 2012). 
Capital is not only the first but also a very important component of CAMEL model 
of banks’ supervision and regulation. CAMEL is an acronym for five components 
of bank safety and soundness: capital adequacy; asset quality; management quality; 
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earning ability and liquidity (Kumar & Sayani, 2015).CAMEL rating system is not 
only a modern technique of financial performance analysis; it also helps in evaluating 
financial soundness and safety of banking institutions (Alani, Yacoob, & Hamdan, 
2013; Kumar & Sayani, 2015). CAMEL potential of identifying banks that may need 
additional capital or alternative arrangements to continue their operations make it 
a viable tool used by supervisory authorities (central banks in most jurisdictions) 
around the world to rate financial soundness of banking institutions (Kumar & Say-
ani, 2015). Capital, as a unique component of CAMEL rating system, is applied in 
terms of its adequacy or ability to protect the banks in their trying periods.
Since the CAMEL framework remains an important tool used by financial sys-
tem regulator in establishing financial soundness of banking institutions, this study 
is set to examine the impact of each of the components on the tendency of a bank 
being regarded as financially sound in Nigeria. Nigerian banks have passed through 
series of recapitalisation regimes and turbulent periods (Adegbaju & Olokoyo, 2008; 
Adeyemi, 2011; Yauri, Musa & Kaoje, 2012). This has resulted in mergers and acqui-
sitions that have produced a number of bigger banks with the sole aim of appearing 
adequately capitalised (Adeyemi, 2011). It is recently revealed that not less than N70 
billion of the public fund was trapped in the failed deposit money banks (DMBs) 
based on the information from Nigerian accountant-general’s office (“FG lost N70 
billion”, 2017). Evidence also abound that a number of DMBs are trading below reg-
ulatory minimum liquidity ratio (“Four banks trading”, 2017; “Four Nigerian Banks”, 
2017). It is also a fact that CAMEL ratings conducted by the banks’ regulators are 
not available in the public domains indicating that they are held in secrecy (Mayes 
& Stremmel, 2014). This requires periodic independent examination of various cat-
egories of CAMEL variables (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014) in order to reawaken the 
consciousness of the depositors and investors. Furthermore, by analysing each of the 
components of CAMEL model’s effect on the banks’ financial soundness and safety 
in Nigeria, individual banks will be privileged to have access to empirical findings 
calling their attention to areas that can jeopardise their chance of appearing a go-
ing-concern and by implication set them free from any threat of liquidation.
Review of Related Literature
This section reviews concepts, theories and empirical findings related to the purpose 
of the study. It also spells out the study’s hypotheses and variables that are tested.
Theoretical Underpinning of Bank’s Capital Regulation and Financial Soundness
Using Modigliani-Miller theory of perfect capital market and absence of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs, the capital structure of the firm does not matter in deciding the 
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value of the firm (Bhatta, 2015). As a matter of fact, information is imperfect and the 
imperfection poses challenge to perfect financial intermediation between borrowers 
and lenders and requires the role for specialised financial intermediaries (Bhatta, 
2015; Montiel, 2003). An integral part of financial intermediation is the bank capital 
regulation. Given the nature of business transacted by the banks and their role as 
intermediaries in the economy, considering banks in the context of capital structure 
concerns should be a priority (Aktas, Acikalin, Bakin & Celik, 2015).United States 
of America (U.S) is known for initiating banks’ capital requirements and this did 
not exist until the early 1980s (Chernykh & Cole, 2015). The lax capital regulation 
pre-1980s in the U.S according to (Chernykh & Cole, 2015, p. 134) “lead to a gradual 
decline in the capital ratios in the U.S. banking system”. Theoretical literature rele-
vant to banks’ capital regulation and financial soundness includes but not limited to: 
regulatory and efficient market-monitoring hypothesis; portfolio regulatory theory; 
moral hazard hypothesis; charter value theory; capital buffer theory and option-pric-
ing model (see, for example, Hendriks, 2000; Ikpefan, 2013; Odunga, Nyangweso, 
Carter & Mwarumba, 2013; Rime, 2001; Scannella, 2012) but regulatory and efficient 
market-monitoring hypothesis, portfolio regulatory theory, and charter value theory 
are considered in this study. 
The regulatory and efficient market-monitoring hypothesis states that regulators 
encourage banks to increase their capital to be commensurate with the amount of 
risk taken by banks (Odunga et al., 2013). Regulators and supervisors are encouraged 
by the conviction that a sound regulatory system brings about compliance with laid 
down rules and corporate governance codes as well as requisite management rou-
tines (Ezeoha, 2011). To institutionalise a sound capital regulation regime therefore, 
efficient market monitoring parameters that will bring about increase in capital when 
banks’ capital positions seem insufficient are indispensable (Calomiris & Kahn, 1991; 
Berger, 1995).It is evident that regulatory and efficient market-monitoring hypothesis 
focuses on the capital adequacy. Against this bad drop, Scannella (2012) summarises 
the consequences of capital adequacy and inadequacy as:
The bank capital inadequacy may force banks to reduce the amount 
of assets or their riskiness. The adequate amount of bank capital rep-
resents a prerequisite for a sound and prudent bank management. It im-
pacts on many aspects of banking activities, such as bank growth and 
competitive dynamics of banking industry, strategic decision processes, 
market positioning, risk profiles of investments, assets and liabilities 
structure, expected profitability, etc (p. 32).
Theory of portfolio regulation is an integral part of banking regulation as a whole. 
Regulation is the rational response of the government to the market failures (Freixas 
& Santomero, 2002). The justification for the regulation of banks is the existence 
of market failures which if not properly attended to would result in either financial 
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institution’s excessive risk taking or in the growth and development of monopoly 
power (Freixas & Santomero, 2002). The theory of portfolio regulation proposes that 
the regulation of banks is necessary to maintain safety and soundness of the banking 
system to an extent that financial institutions will be in a position to meet their finan-
cial obligations without difficulty (Ikpefan, 2013). Summarily, the theory allows the 
regulators to command greater solvency, liquidity and soundness of individual banks 
(Ikpefan, 2013).
Another theory that provides a nexus of banks’ capital requirements with their 
safety and soundness is charter value theory. Charter value, also known as “franchise 
value”, is the value that would be forgone if an organization closes (Demsetz, Saiden-
berg, & Strahan, 1996; Keeley, 1990). Charter value is the bank’s future profit-gen-
erating potential arising from things such as efficiency, market power and customer 
relationships (Palia & Porter 2004). Being an important intrinsic value of a bank, 
charter value represents an important indication for governments and investors to see 
how stable and profitable the bank is (Hendriks, 2000). Since the overall value of a 
firm incorporates both tangible and intangible assets, franchise value is described as 
the firm’s intangible assets, that is, the value of the firm above and beyond the value 
of its tangible assets (Ren & Schmit, 2006). The central argument of this theory is 
that banks have something to lose since bankruptcy leads to a loss of future profits 
(Jokipii & Milne, 2011). The only condition for reaping the charter value by a bank is 
if it survives (Fisher, Gueyie & Ortiz, 2001). Thus, franchise value provides risk-con-
straining incentives to firms that seek to remain a going-concern (Ren & Schmit, 
2006). There is evidence of decreasing bank franchise value during the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s when the banking industry was experiencing the deregulation (Keeley, 
1990).Previous studies have documented positive relationships between charter value 
and capital requirements (Allen & Rai, 1996; Hellman, Murdoch & Stiglitz, 2000). 
Hellmann et al. (2000) empirically showed that once banks have enough of their own 
capital invested, equity holders internalise the adverse consequences of taking risk 
and thus will choose to make more prudent investments. Hendriks (2000) concludes 
that capital levels are a significant positive factor for determining bank charter value 
after establishing that when there are higher capital requirements, the shareholders 
want to invest in more safe assets which will result in a higher charter value. While 
establishing the fact that the cessation from appearing as a going concern by a bank 
has significant relationship with the loss of charter value, Estrella, Park and Peristiani 
(2000) provide the following:
This potential loss in the value of the firm in liquidation also helps 
explain why capital levels in general should be significantly related to 
bank failure. The charter value of the bank produces a strong incentive 
to the owners of the bank to manage it as a going concern. If the bank 
fails, one consequence is the dissipation of charter value—value that 
the owners could capture by selling their stakes if the institution were 
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viable. Thus, owners have an interest in maintaining a level of capital 
that is consistent with a low probability of failure. Needless to say, reg-
ulators and supervisors also tend to favour low probabilities of failure 
(p. 35).
According to Rime (2001, p. 791) “capital regulation is motivated principally by 
the concern that a bank may hold less capital than is socially optimal relative to its 
riskiness as negative externalities resulting from bank default are not reflected in 
market capital requirements”. Further evidence provides that unregulated banking 
system is characterised with excessive portfolio and leverage risks taking in the name 
of maximising shareholders’ value at the expense of deposit insurance (Furlong & 
Keeley, 1989). Given the linkage of bank capital requirements with financial safety 
and soundness, this study adopts all the three theories because of their emphasis on 
the significance of capital regulation in reducing banks’ probability of default and 
strengthening the stability of the banking system.
An Overview of CAMEL Framework
CAMEL model is the mechanism used for the critical analysis of the financial posi-
tion of banks and the presentation of such analysis to provide for the assessment of 
the health of the banks (Khatik & Nag, 2014). It can also be described as a ratio-based 
model used specifically for evaluating the performance and/or rating or ranking of 
banks (Khatik & Nag, 2014; Misra & Aspa, 2013). “The CAMEL ratings system 
examines capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity and 
is widely used by supervisory bodies around the world to rate financial soundness 
of banking institutions” (Kumar & Sayani, 2015, p. 2). In fact CAMEL remains the 
most popular approach of bank ratings system (Baral, 2005; Doumpos & Zopounidis, 
2010).The need to justify the intertwining of the safety and soundness of the bank-
ing system with the stability of the economy calls for the use of CAMEL model as 
it incorporates bank specific factors/variables of true profitability and soundness as 
well as five risk categories rated by the supervisory authorities (Whalen & Thomson, 
1988).In on-site examinations to determine the financial condition of a bank, super-
visory agency (CBN in Nigeria) rates the bank on a scale from one to five (one being 
the highest) in five basic areas (Gilbert, Meyer & Vaughan, 2002; Mayes & Stremmel, 
2014; Whalen & Thomson, 1988). In Nigeria, ratings A-E are used in place of ratings 
1-5 (Njoku, 2011). The banks rated class ‘A’ are the very strong ones. Sound banks are 
rated Class ‘B’. Fundamentally sound and stable banks with limited supervisory con-
cerns are in Class ‘C’. Marginal banks with serious financial weaknesses requiring 
close supervisory attention are put in Class ‘D’. Class ‘E’ represents the critically ill 
banks that have immediate failure possibilities. Based on CAMEL model as at end-
March, 2004, the CBN’s ratings of all the banks, classified 62 as sound/satisfactory, 
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14 as marginal and 11 as unsound, while 2 of the banks did not render any returns 
during the period (Soludo, 2004). CAMEL model focuses on accounting and finan-
cial data for individual banks (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014).The inclusion of “sensitivity 
to market risk” in the CAMEL framework expands the components of the model 
and renames it CAMELS. This component was not added to the model until 1997 
by the bank examiners (Gilbert et al., 2002), although it is seldom applied in most 
developing countries (Baral, 2005).To corroborate the efficacy of CAMEL model 
as adopted by supervisory authorities, a number of studies have also used CAMEL 
rating model to evaluate the performance and financial condition of banks (see, for 
example, Abdelrahim, 2013; Baral, 2005; Doumpos & Zopounidis, 2010; Khatik & 
Nag, 2014; Khouaja & Boumediene, 2014; Kouser, Aamir, Mehvish & Azeem, 2011; 
Kumar & Sayani, 2015; Misra & Aspal, 2013; Prasad & Ravinder, 2012; Roman & 
Şargu, 2013; Sangmi & Nazir, 2010; Whalen & Thomson, 1988; Zagherd & Barghi, 
2017). Majority of these studies adopted supervisor’s approach of rating or ranking 
banks by means of individual CAMEL parameters and composite CAMEL ratings. 
In the alternative, this study examines the impact of these bank-specific factors on the 
ability of the banking industry to appear financially safe and sound as represented by 
the ability of DMBs to meet the Basel capital adequacy ratio (CAR) adopted by the 
banks’ regulators the world over including Nigeria.
Determining Choice of Accounting Measures of Bank-Specific Variables
This sub-section provides evidence of indicators of each component of CAMELS 
framework adopted for the study.
Capital Adequacy
Capital requirements have a long tradition in the banking regulation (Detzer, 
2015).“Insufficient equity capital has been partly blamed for the Global Financial 
Crisis” (Abdulkarim, Hassan, Hassan & Mohamad, 2014, p. 58). A bank in a com-
fortable capital position is on a sound footing to pursue business opportunities more 
effectively and has more time and flexibility to deal with problems arising from un-
expected losses, thus achieving increased profitability (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). 
Bank capital acts as a buffer against liquidity shocks and portfolio losses (Cordell 
& King, 1995; Diamond & Rajan, 2000) and also serves as the last line of defense 
against losses to uninsured depositors, general creditors and the deposit insurance 
corporation (Whalen & Thomson, 1988). The minimum capital requirements initia-
tive as introduced by Banks for International Settlement (BIS) in 1996 was geared 
towards enabling that banks are prudent in maintaining adequate reserves as a shield 
to protect themselves and their depositors (Abdulkarim et al., 2014). Capital adequa-
cy is borne out of the necessity to rearrange the existing capital structure of banks 
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with a view to repositioning the existing capital structure to guard against the losses 
that accrue as their operating activities widen (Ezike & Oke, 2013). It is all-inclusive 
and as well reflects the inner strength of a bank (Sangmi & Nazir, 2010). The need 
for capital adequacy can also be inferred from the need to avoid the consequences of 
financial distress as succinctly stated by Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995):
Financial distress occurs when the bank is expected to have difficulty 
honoring its commitments. Costs of financial distress include the costs 
of bankruptcy -- i.e., the costs of transferring ownership of the firm from 
shareholders to creditors. Financial distress costs also include the loss 
in value that may occur as a result of the perception that bankruptcy 
may be imminent -- even if bankruptcy may ultimately be avoided (p. 5).
Bank capital requirements are products of Basel Accords. Basel Accords, which 
are international agreements among central banks members of the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlement (BIS), are aimed at promoting safety and soundness of the financial 
system; ensuring adequate level of capital to safeguard the bank’s deposits and en-
hancing competitive equality (Coyle, 2000; Abdelrahim, 2013). The accords operate 
in form of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as established by 
the central bank governors of a group of ten countries in 1975 (Suarez, Dhaene, Hen-
rard, & Vanduffel, 2006). BCBS has produced three international guidelines known 
as Basel I, Basel II and Basel III produced in 1988, 2004 and 2010 respectively (Ab-
delrahim, 2013; Hogan, 2015).
All components of CAMELS framework including capital adequacy comprise a 
number accounting measures or ratios. Capital adequacy, for instance, is represented 
by a number of accounting measures- capital adequacy ratio (CAR) which is the 
product of BCBS guidelines and purely risk-based, capital to asset ratio, advances 
to asset ratio, leverage ratio (LVR), government securities to total investments ratio 
and gross revenue ratio (GRR), but most prominent of them is CAR (see Abdelrahim, 
2013; Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Chernykh & Cole, 2015; Doumpos & Zopounidis, 
2010; Khatik & Nag, 2014; Misra & Aspal, 2013; Sangmi & Nazir, 2010; Şargu, 
2013;). CAR as recommended by Basel accords is risk-based and is defined as the 
ratio of addition of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capitals to risk-weighted assets (TCAR) for to-
tal capital ratio (see Abdulkarim et al., 2014; Aspal & Nazneen, 2014; Chernykh & 
Cole, 2015; Hogan, 2015; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014) and the ratio of Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets- T1CR (Banerjee & Majumdar, 2014; Chernykh & Cole, 2015; 
Mathuva, 2009; Schütz, 2014; Smith, Grill & Lang, 2017) considered as core capital 
ratio (Mathuva, 2009; Odunga et al., 2013). The sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital is the 
risk-based capital (RBC) adjusted for items such as intangible assets and unrealised 
gains or losses while risk-weighted assets (RWA) is the sum of all bank asset catego-
ries multiplied by their designated risk weightings (Hogan, 2015). RWA represents 
an aggregate of credit RWA, market RWA and operational RWA (CBN). Based on 
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Basel’s standard, Tier 1 capital is an aggregate of shareholder funds, retained earn-
ings, and perpetual non-cumulative preference shares scaled by risk-weighted assets 
and off-balance sheet exposures (Schütz, 2014). Although TCAR benchmark recom-
mended by BCBS is 8%, CBN fixes 10% and 15% as minimum TCAR for deposit 
money banks with regional/national and international operating licences respectively 
in Nigeria (see CBN, 2015). For the domestic systematically important banks (SIBs) 
in Nigeria, the required minimum regulatory CAR is 15% in addition to setting 
aside 1% higher loss absorbency or what is referred to as additional capital surcharge 
(CBN, 2014). 
Both the GRR and LVR are considered good measures of capital adequacy (Bank 
for International Settlement-BIS, 2010; Estrella et al., 2000) despite being risk-inde-
pendent. Indeed, there are both potent explanatory variables used in the prediction 
of bank’s financial condition in previous studies (see Estrella et al., 2000; Mayes & 
Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014). While GRR is described as the ratio of Tier 1 capital 
to gross earnings, that is, the sum of total interest and non-interest income (Mayes 
& Stremmel, 2014), LVR is often measured as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total ad-
justed assets (TAAT) where TAAT is described as total assets less intangible assets 
comprising goodwill, software expenses and deferred tax assets (D’Hulster, 2009). 
For the purpose of this study, therefore, TCAR and T1CR are adopted as the 
measures of bank financial soundness. Although, there are a number of indicators for 
bank financial soundness (Kutum & Al-Jaberi, 2015), risk-based capital ratios remain 
unique among them and are consistently used in the literature (Nikhat, 2014; Salgotra 
& Wadhwa, 2015). The risk-based capitals are incontrovertibly prerequisite for sound 
and prudent bank management (Scannella, 2012). The leverage ratio (LVR) and gross 
revenue ratio (GRR) are adopted as measures of capital adequacy in consonance 
with the previous studies on bank financial condition (Estrella et al., 2000; Mayes & 
Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014).
Asset Quality
According to Chisti (2012, p. 127), “bank asset quality does not only affect the finan-
cial and operating performance of the bank itself, it also impinges on the soundness 
of the national financial system”. The condition and quality of individual asset cat-
egories can trigger financial problems and can as well accelerate the bank fragility 
(Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). Banks that hold qualitatively inferior assets are more 
vulnerable to losses and consequence of the capital loss is the increase in the risk 
of failure (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). What the bank examiners do to verify the 
quality of banks asset is to“wade through loan documentation and check the quality 
of collateral (if any) backing each loan” (Whalen & Thomson, 1988). Chisti (2012) 
empirically found that when a bank’s asset quality becomes worse, it takes more 
resources for the bank to conduct non- value-added credit receiving activities, which 
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leads to poor performance. In other words, the better the asset quality of a bank, the 
better its operating performance and the worse the asset quality of a bank the poorer 
its operating performance. By virtue of spread of bank activities and range of asset 
figures disclosed, there exists a wide variety of potential indicators of asset quality 
(Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). Accounting measures of asset quality include ratios of: 
net performing assets to total assets; net performing assets to net advances; total in-
vestments to total assets; net loan to total asset, net loan to deposit, non-performing 
loans to gross loans (NPL/GL) and loan loss provision to net interest revenue (LLP/
NIR) but LLP/NIR and NPL/GL are more helpful and often used (Bourkhis & Nabi, 
2013; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Misra & Aspal, 2013). In compliance with literature 
on bank asset quality LLP/NIR and NPL/GL are adopted as a proxy of asset quality 
for the study.
Management Quality
The significance of the ability and skill of the bank management in the performance 
and success of the entity cannot be overemphasised (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). Man-
agement quality or efficiency focuses on the “adherence with set norms, ability to 
plan and respond to changing environment, leadership and administrative capability 
of the bank” (Misra & Aspal, 2013, p. 44). It is difficult to divorce the higher the man-
agement competence with the lower vulnerability of the bank to and its likelihood of 
making wrong decisions (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). Although it is difficult to find 
an independent indicator of management quality or expertise (Mayes & Stremmel, 
2014), common ratio researchers have been used is cost to income ratio (CIR) other-
wise known as ratio of expenses to revenue (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Klomp & Haan, 
2012; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014). This CAMELS’s component can also 
be measured by the asset turnover ratio, ratio of revenue to total asset- RTA (Abdel-
rahim, 2013). Thus, CIR and RTA are adopted as proxies of management quality. 
Earning Capacity
Bank examiners regard earnings as the “first line of defense against loan defaults 
and other unforeseen events” (Whalen & Thomson, 1988, p. 18). It is highly probable 
that higher levels of profitability allow banks to improve their capital and economic 
performance and by implication achieve a negative relationship between profitability 
and the likelihood of distress (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). A bank that cannot suf-
ficiently maintain its earnings is liable to make losses and suffer considerably from 
sustainable growth (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Misra & Aspal, 2013). The profitabili-
ty indicators as obtained from the literature include: net income to total asset (ROA); 
net income to Shareholders’ equity (ROE); net interest income to earning asset; and 
interest income to total income (Misra & Aspal, 2013; Tan, 2016). However, this 
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study examines the impact of ROA and ROE on the banking soundness because they 
appear most prominent (Olson & Zoubi, 2011) and have sufficient empirical evidence 
even in the recent time (Odunga, 2016; Tan, 2016; Zagherd & Barghi, 2017).
Liquidity
Liquidity crisis has a negative impact on the image of a financial institution (Misra 
& Aspal, 2013). A bank’s ability to meet and repay its short-term obligations and 
unexpected withdrawals of depositors and creditors is a function of how liquid it is 
(Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). “Liquid assets refer to cash and its equivalent that are 
easily convertible to cash at any time without significant losses” (Bourkhis & Nabi, 
2013, p. 71).When financial assets cease to be available to the owners on short no-
tice liquidity problem ensues in the bank (Sangmi & Nazir, 2010). The indicators of 
liquidity in the banking industry used in the literature include the following: liquid 
assets to total assets (LTA), investment (government securities) to total assets, liquid 
asset to deposit (LTD) and investment to deposit (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Mayes & 
Stremmel, 2014; Sangmi & Nazir, 2010). Basel III emphasises on “net stable funding 
ratio”, an equivalent of LTD which indicates the percentage of loans funded through 
deposits and the stability of funding (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). Based on this ratio-
nale, LTA and LTD are considered most appropriate as the proxies of the liquidity. 
This complies with the approach of Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) on banking soundness.
Sensitivity to Market Risks
The inclusion of sensitivity to market risk in the CAMEL framework expands the 
component of the model and renames it CAMELS. The shifts and fluctuations in 
the financial market have significant impact on the activities of banks (Mayes & 
Stremmel, 2014). The assessment of the sensitivity to market risk can only be done 
through fluctuations in interest rate, foreign exchange rates and equity prices (Aspal 
& Nazneen, 2014). “Banks are vulnerable to market distortions if they rely heavily on 
market refinancing or are holding highly volatile assets” (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014, 
p. 13-14).The assessment of the impact of market risk is very important to Nigerian 
banks. Apart from the fact that Nigerian banks are part of major stakeholders in the 
financial market, their stocks often appear most traded in the stocks exchange. The 
omission of this component in the determination of banks’ financial condition is 
not unconnected with difficulties in capturing its relationship with accounting and 
financial data (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). In spite of this challenge, researchers have 
attempted to represent this component with a number of measures including size and 
deposit ratios (Baral, 2005; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014) but using bank’s holding with 
volatile liabilities is considered more appropriate (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). Based 
on the empirical works of Klomp and Haan (2012) and Schütz (2014), the market risk 
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can be measured by the ratio of total interest expenses to total deposit. In order to 
identify maturity and repricing mismatches between assets, liabilities, and off-bal-
ance sheet items (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation- FDIC, 2015), interest rate 
risk can also be measured using gap analysis (Aspal & Nazneen, 2014; FDIC, 2015). 
Empirically, the influence of this interest rate risk measurement on bank’s financial 
condition has been established (Aspal & Nazneen, 2014). Hence, the total interest 
expenses to total deposit (MKR1) and interest gap ratio (MKR2) are adopted as the 
measures of sensitivity to market risk for this study. Since the market risk sensitivity 
has positive influence on bank financial distress (Schütz, 2014), its impact on bank 
financial soundness should be negative. 
Control Variables
This study adopts four (4) additional explanatory variables: bank size (SIZE); age 
since the commencement of operation (AGE); systematically important status (SIM); 
and the penalties for contravening related banks’ legal and institutional frameworks 
(PEN), considered relevant to bank’s financial condition. In the related accounting 
literature, firm size is often represented by natural logarithm of any of the total assets, 
net sales or firm’s market capitalization (Wallace & Naser, 1995). Previous research 
on CAMEL and banking soundness measured bank size with natural logarithm of 
banks’ total assets (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Bahadori, Talebnia, & Imani, 2015; 
Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Tan, 2016) and that of age (Bahadori et al., 2015). Thus, 
as adopted by Gilbert, Meyer and Vaughan (2000) and Bahadori et al. (2015), natural 
logarithm of total assets and the age of individual banks are used as the measures of 
the two variables respectively. The Basel III requirement of additional capital sur-
charge and its creation of two liquidity standards, the liquidity coverage ratio and 
the net stable funding ratio, for SIBs (BIS, 2010; Labonte, 2017) are suggestive of 
positive relationship between SIM and bank’s financial soundness. Using regulatory 
and efficient market hypothesis, a sound regulatory system is expected to bring about 
compliance with laid down rules and corporate governance codes as well as requisite 
management routines (Ezeoha, 2011). This presupposes that the imposition of fines 
and the publication of such for contravening bank’s statutes and other frameworks 
have inverse relationship with bank’s financial soundness. Hence it is expected that 
the penalty for the contravention (PEN) of banking regulation in Nigeria has a nega-
tive influence on the financial soundness of DMBs.
Research Hypotheses
Having regard to the requirements of the statute and the need to cater for the financial 
soundness of Nigerian DMBs as well as findings of previous related studies (Abdel-
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rahim, 2013; Bahadori et al., 2015; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Muhmad & Hashim, 
2015; Schütz, 2014; Zagherd & Barghi, 2017), the following hypotheses are formulat-
ed to examine the impact of these bank-specific factors.
Hypothesis I
Capital adequacy, measured by leverage ratio and gross revenue ratio, has significant 
positive impact on the bank’s financial soundness in Nigeria.
Hypothesis II
Loan loss provision to net interest revenue and non-performing loans to gross loans, 
representing asset quality, negatively and significantly influence Nigerian DMBs’ fi-
nancial soundness.
Hypothesis III
Management soundness has significant impact on the ability of Nigeria DMBs to 
appear financially sound.
This hypothesis can be further broken into two (2) based on the variables of the 
study:
H3:1 Bank’s financial soundness is negatively and significantly influenced by the 
cost-to-income ratio.
H3:2 Gross earnings to total assets have significant positive influence on the DMBs’ 
financial soundness in Nigeria.
Hypothesis IV
Profitability, measured by return on assets and return on equity, has significant posi-
tive influence on bank’s financial soundness in Nigeria.
Hypothesis V
Liquidity, measured by liquid assets to total assets and liquid assets to deposit, has 
significant positive influence on bank’s financial soundness in Nigeria
Hypothesis VI
Sensitivity to market risk influences negatively and significantly the ability of Nige-
rian DMBs being financially sound.
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Empirical Evidence
In accounting and finance literature CAMELS-related studies are conducted to de-
termine and analyze banking soundness and/or predict banking failure or financial 
distress. The findings of these studies are diverse. Whalen and Thomson (1988), using 
financial data to identify changes in financial condition of banks in the Cleveland, 
were able to establish the predictive power of CAMEL rating model. In particular, 
the results of logistic regression confirmed the critical predictive role of asset quality 
and earning measures most especially the ratio of non-performing loans to primary 
capital. In a study conducted to investigate the early signals of banking sector vul-
nerabilities in central and eastern European emerging markets, Männasoo and Mayes 
(2005) showed, by the use of fixed effects panel logit model that, macroeconomic 
variables tend to give a signal earlier than most of financial variables but with a 
clause that Wald test strongly rejects the hypothesis that either the bank-specific vari-
ables or macroeconomic variables are irrelevant for explaining the crisis probability. 
The study found the bank-specific factors to be more important in the later stages 
and gain more weight as the banking sector develops and the institutional framework 
becomes mature. Specifically, they found non-performing loans, cost-income ratio, 
solvency, liquidity, and profitability measures as good determinants of banks’ sound-
ness. The potential of CAMELS model in analysing banking soundness and finan-
cial condition is also reinforced by Mayes and Stremmel (2014) who examined the 
effectiveness of capital adequacy measures in predicting bank distress. A contrast of 
logit model and time survival analysis showed that the influence of the bank-specific 
characteristics in the determination of banks’ financial condition in both approaches 
is slightly different. Summarily, capital adequacy, asset quality and earning ability 
measures have higher explanatory power. The study found, in all, 80% and 98% pre-
dictive accuracy for CAMELS model using logit and time survival analysis respec-
tively. In an Indian study of an empirical analysis of capital adequacy in the context 
of bank-specific performance factors, Aspal and Nazneen (2014), using ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression analysis, revealed that Loans, Management Efficiency, Li-
quidity and Sensitivity have statistically significant influence on the capital adequacy 
of private sector banks but the influence of asset quality is negligible. 
For Abdelrahim (2013) only accounting measure of liquidity is found to have 
significant positive impact on the bank’s financial condition/soundness indicated by 
capital adequacy ratio in the Saudi’s context. The study further found a significant 
influence of SIZE but negatively against the expectation. Iranian empirical evidence 
provided by Bateni, Vakilifard and Asghari (2014) from a dataset of 6 private-
ly-owned Iranian banks for the period 2006-2012 using panel regression showed that 
two components of CAMELS framework, capital adequacy and earnings quality, ex-
plain banks’ financial soundness as measured by total risk-weighted capital (TCAR). 
The bank-specific variables making up these two components are equity-to-assets 
ratio, ROA and ROE which are all significantly positive. A South Eastern European 
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(SEE) countries study of the impact of bank-dimensional and environmental factors 
on CAR by Aktas et al. (2015) found aside environmental factors the positive impact 
of a number of accounting measures of CAMELS on CAR. Using the Feasible Gen-
eralised Least Square (FGLS) regression, it was found that the bank dimensional ex-
planatory variables: size; ROA; leverage; liquidity; net interest margin and risk show 
statistically significant effects on CAR for the banks in the region. 
A logistic regression (Probit) analysis of the relationship between financial sound-
ness (indexed by CAR) and measures of components of CAMELS framework in an 
Iranian study could not but find positive impacts of bank-specific determinants on 
financial soundness of commercial and non-commercial banks in Iran. As found 
by Bahadori et al. (2015), there is no sufficient evidence to show that measures of 
CAMELS framework have no significant impact on financial stability index or CAR 
of Iranian banks except the liquidity and profitability variables on commercial banks 
and liquidity measure on non-commercial banks. Although not all indicators of 
CAMEL framework were adopted, Riaz’s (2016) findings for Pakistani banks based 
on bank-level and macroeconomic data between 2009 and 2013 revealed the signif-
icant influence of accounting measures of bank liquidity, operating efficiency (CIR) 
and profitability (ROA) on bank’s financial soundness measured by total regulatory 
capital ratio (TCAR). 
Although Duqi and Al-Tamimi (2017) sought to examine the impacts of owner’s 
identity on banks’ capital adequacy and liquidity risk, incidental to their findings is 
that some bank-specific variables statistically explain total regulatory capital (TCAR) 
and Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (T1CR). These bank-specific variables as established 
by Duqi and Al-Tamimi (2017) using a sample of 188 banks- both listed and unlisted, 
from 13 countries in the Middle East and North Africa for the period 2000-2011, are 
loan loss ratio (measuring asset quality) which has significantly negative impact on 
Tier 1 capital but indifference to TCAR and cost-to-income ratio (measuring man-
agement quality) which has negative influence on both measures of CAR but sig-
nificant on T1CR based on the results of system Generalised Methods of Moment 
(system-GMM). Other significant variables but not parts of CAMELS indicators are 
operating leverage (fixed assets-to-total assets) with negative influence on T1CR and 
SIZE with negative influence on both measures of CAR. For Kalifa & Bektaş (2018) 
who examined how bank-specific and macroeconomic variables affect capital adequa-
cy ratio of Islamic banks of Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Qatar, Indonesia, Turkey, Kuwait, 
United Arab Emirate and Bahrain for the period 2005-2014, a number of bank-spe-
cific variables are found to be good predictors of Islamic banks’ financial soundness. 
Specifically, the results of Arellano-Bond Generalised Methods of Moment (GMM) 
showed that ROA, ROE, credit risk and leverage aside the lag of the capital adequacy 
ratio affect the Basel II capital adequacy ratio. While ROA, leverage and credit risk 
positively and significantly influence Islamic banks’ CAR, ROE has significantly neg-
ative impact. Also found to explain significantly Basel II CAR of Islamic banks by 
Kalifa & Bektaş (2018) is the size of these banks but negatively. 
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Methodology
Studies on bank failure and soundness incorporate substantially elements of prediction 
(Bahadori et al., 2015; Männasoo & Mayes, 2005). In these studies, the use of logis-
tic regression and/or linear regression has been found very useful (Aktas et al., 2015; 
Männasoo & Mayes, 2005; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014; Zagherd & Barghi, 
2017). Since the information about the measures of bank financial soundness (TCAR 
and T1CR) are readily available, the choice of linear regression is considered appro-
priate. Though there are several indicators for each of the components of CAMELS 
framework (Klomp & Haan, 2012), the impact of a number of them on bank’s financial 
condition have been empirically established in previous related studies (see Aspal & 
Nazneen, 2014; Bahadori et al., 2015; Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Mayes & Stremmel, 
2014; Schütz, 2014; Zagherd & Barghi, 2017). Based on the deductions from previous 
studies, banks’ financial soundness is made a function of the indicators of CAMELs 
framework and a number of other variables. This is as presented in the models below:
Model I
BFS GRR NPL GL CIR ROA LTA
MKR
it it it it it it
i
= µ + + + + +
+
b b b b b
b
1 2 3 4 5
6 1
/
t it it it it itSIZE AGE SIM PEN+ + + + +b b b b e7 8 9 10
 (1)
Model II
BFS LVR LLP NIR RTA ROE LTD
MKR
it it it it it it= µ + + + + +
+
b b b b b
b
1 2 3 4 5
6 2
/
it it it it it itSIZE AGE SIM PEN+ + + + +b b b b e7 8 9 10
 (2)
In the two models, BFS stands for bank financial soundness which is either TCAR 
or T1CR. The variables of coefficients b b1 6-  represent the accounting measures of 
each of the components of CAMELS framework respectively while those of coeffi-
cients b b7 10-  are measures of control variables in both models. Although this study 
has two models, using two measures of the dependent variable shows that there are 
four (4) equations in all. All the variables of the study are described in Table 1. 
Data related to the variables of this paper are obtained from published annual 
reports and accounts of individual banks. Although there are more than 20 DMBs in 
Nigeria, only 15 are listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). Therefore, only 
DMBs whose accounting information is publicly available are included in this study. 
The bank-dimensional data obtained fall within 2012-2016, a purely International 
Financial Reporting Standards’ (IFRS’s) era of Nigerian banking sector. With 15 
DMBs listed on NSE, 75 bank-year observations are probable but an unbalanced 
panel data of 72 bank-year observation is settled for due to unavailability of a number 
of annual reports.
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 In a panel data regression as used in this study, a choice has to be made between 
its random-effects (RE) model and fixed-effects (FE) model based on the results of 
Hausman test (Baltagi, 2005; Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Torres-Reyna, 2007a). Upon 
the choice of RE model, a further test is carried out, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Mul-
tiplier (BPLM), to decide whether to use random-effects regression and a simple 
ordinary least squared (OLS) regression (Torres-Reyna, 2007a). Having followed this 
procedure, a simple OLS is adopted given the results of Hausman tests (HausM) 
which show that the residuals are not correlated with the regressors (that is, p>0.05) 
and BPLM which show no panel effects across sampled banks (that is p>0.05). Other 
tests carried out include: Breusch-Pagan Cook-Weisberg (BP-CW1) with fitted values 
of dependent variable and BP-CW2 with independent variables (Baum, 2006) for 
heteroscedasticity; and the pair-wise correlations and variance inflation factor (VIF) 
for discovering the level multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables. The data 
are not only analysed inferentially, descriptive statistics like mean, standard devia-
tion, minimum and maximum values are also performed.
Table 1: Variables’ Definitions




1 Total Regulatory Capital Ratio (TCAR) Dependent
Sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capitals scaled 
by risk-weighted assets  
2 Core Capital Ratio (T1CR) Dependent Tier 1 capital scaled by risk-weighted assets  
3 Gross Revenue Ratio (GRR) Independent Tier 1 capital scaled by the sum of interest and non-interest income +
4 Leverage Ratio (LVR) Independent The ratio of Tier 1 capital to total adjusted assets +
5 Non-Performing Loan Ratio (NPL/GL) Independent Non-performing Loans to Gross Loans -
6
Impairment for Loan Losses 
in Profit or Loss account 
(LLP/NIR)
Independent The ratio of impairment for loan losses in income statement to Net Interest Income -
7 Cost to Income Ratio (CIR) Independent Ratio of operating expenses to operating income -
8 Asset Turnover (RTA) Independent Ratio of Gross revenue to total asset +
9 Return on Asset (ROA) Independent Net income scaled by total assets +
10 Return on Equity (ROE) Independent Ratio of Net income to shareholders’ fund +
11 Liquidity (LTA) Independent Total Liquid Assets scaled by Total Assets +
12 Liquidity (LTD) Independent Liquid Assets to Total Deposits +
13 Market Risk (MKR1) Independent total interest expenses to total deposit
14 Interest Gap Ratio (MKR2) Independent
Difference between Rate-Sensitive Assets 
and Rate-Sensitive Liabilities scaled by 
earning assets 
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15 Banks’ Size (SIZE) Control Natural Logarithm of Bank’s Total Assets +
16 Bank’s Age (AGE) Control Natural Logarithm of Bank’s Age since Commencement of Operation +
17 DMB’s Systemic Status (SIM) Control
‘1’ is assigned if a DMB is classified as 
Systematically Important Bank (SIB), 
otherwise ‘0’
+
18 Contravention of Banking Regulation (PEN) Control
Natural Logarithm of penalties paid for 
contravening banking regulation yearly by 
each bank
-
Source: Authors’ compilation, 2017 based on deduction from related literature
Data Analysis and Results
This section presents the results of various statistical analyses carried out to achieve 
the purpose of this study. While descriptive statistics reveal mean, standard devi-
ation, minimum and maximum values of all variables of the study, the correlation 
analysis and VIF seek to find the extent of multi-collinearity. The regression analyses 
depict the impact of each of the explanatory variables on DMBs’ financial soundness 
in Nigeria.
Descriptive Statistics
As obtainable in Table 2, the mean values of TCAR and T1CR which measure bank’s 
financial soundness are 16.2% and 13.7% respectively. These values fall within the 
benchmark for all DMBs whether SIB, international, national or regional. Converse-
ly, the minimum value of -47% for both measures, are indeed not a good omen for 
DMBs in Nigeria. Similar scenario applies to GRR and LVR which are measures 
of capital adequacy. Although the average values, 74% and 9%, for both measures 
respectively are satisfactory, the minimum values of -259% and -48% are substantial 
indicators of capital inadequacy of a number of DMBs in Nigeria due to negative 
core capital (Tier 1 Capital). A non-performing loan ratio that is as low as 2% and 
that is averaged 8% is good but a maximum value of 96.5% is source of concern. 
For impairment for loan losses charged in the income statement, its ratio to net in-
terest revenue of 19.2% is reported within the sampled period while it is as high as 
73%. Regarding CIR, a measure of management soundness, an average value of 77% 
accounts for why ROA and ROE are at low ebb averaged 1.6% and 5% respective-
ly. The liquidity measures, LTA and LTD, are averaged 38% and 56% respectively. 
Conversely, their minimum values of 2.6% for LTA and in particular 22% for LTD 
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which is below benchmark of 30% is another source of concern. For interest rate risk, 
MKR1 and MKR2 are averaged 5.3% and 10.4% respectively. Apart from NPL/GL, 
ROE and a couple of others, there is no much variability in the values of each variable 
with standard deviation being less than mean values. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of all Variables of the Study
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TCAR 72 0.1616 0.1142 -0.4698 0.305
T1CR 72 0.1366 0.1090 -0.4698 0.303
GRR 72 0.7392 0.5805 -2.5896 1.56
LVR 72 0.0865 0.0877 -0.4779 0.18
NPL/GL 72 0.0761 0.1277 0.0171 0.9646
LLP/NIR 72 0.1917 0.1785 0 0.7266
CIR 72 0.7734 0.3057 0.3685 2.84
RTA 72 0.1234 0.0175 0.0918 0.1865
ROA 72 0.0162 0.0150 -0.056 0.053
ROE 72 0.0543 0.4948 -3.94 0.296
LTA 72 0.3799 0.1243 0.0260 0.6134
LTD 72 0.5560 0.1661 0.2211 0.9984
MKR1 72 0.0526 0.0153 0.0236 0.0845
MKR2 72 0.1040 0.1438 -0.2411 0.4939
SIZE 72 20.9503 0.6707 19.3196 22.1781
AGE 72 3.4795 0.6885 1.7918 4.8040
SIM 72 0.4028 0.4939 0 1
PEN 72 10.0838 2.3290 0 14.9037
Source: Authors’ computation, 2017, based on Stata version 14 outputs
Correlation Analysis
High correlation is noticeable between some variables which is suggestive of 
multi-collinearity based on the information in Table 3. These variables include; LVR 
and GRR; NPL/GL and GRR; NPL/GL and LVR; and SIM and SIZE. Since all the 
variables are not used together in a model, for instance, GRR and LVR and the NPL/
GL and LVR, the issue of multi-collinearity is mitigated. To confirm the reality of 
the multi-collinearity of those that are used together in a model, a further test of 
multi-collinearity, VIF, is conducted. The results of which are included in the Table 4 
and Table 5 of regression estimates. Based on the results of VIF in the Tables 4 and 5, 
the highest VIF for the first model is 9.57 and 4.59 for the second model (mean VIF: 
4.72 and 2.11 respectively). The lowest tolerance values (VIF reciprocal or 1/VIF) are 
0.105 and 0.218 for Model I and Model II respectively. Where VIF does not exceed 10 
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and 1/VIF is higher than 0.1, as palpable in this study, multi-collinearity is not pres-
ent among the explanatory variables (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Torres-Reyna, 2007b).
Table 3: Correlation Matrix
Variable GRR LVR NPL/GL
LLP/
NIR CIR RTA ROA ROE LTA LTD MKR1 MKR2 SIZE AGE SIM PEN
GRR 1.00
LVR 0.97 1.00
NPL/GL -0.84 -0.90 1.00
LLP/NIR -0.52 -0.51 0.58 1.00
CIR -0.51 -0.48 0.30 0.50 1.00
RTA -0.55 -0.48 0.57 0.59 0.29 1.00
ROA 0.52 0.49 -0.27 -0.49 -0.91 -0.16 1.00
ROE 0.40 0.35 -0.12 -0.27 -0.49 -0.07 0.52 1.00
LTA 0.50 0.45 -0.37 -0.22 -0.41 -0.28 0.34 0.31 1.00
LTD 0.43 0.39 -0.29 -0.12 -0.30 -0.09 0.30 0.30 0.91 1.00
MKR1 -0.36 -0.30 0.17 0.11 0.40 0.37 -0.48 -0.28 -0.28 -0.15 1.00
MKR2 0.32 0.28 -0.05 -0.01 -0.25 0.03 0.34 0.32 0.18 0.18 -0.22 1.00
SIZE 0.61 0.51 -0.31 -0.12 -0.51 -0.48 0.49 0.38 0.51 0.44 -0.65 0.34 1.00
AGE -0.11 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.27 -0.09 -0.14 -0.11 -0.10 -0.17 -0.24 0.14 1.00
SIM 0.32 0.23 -0.17 0.05 -0.30 -0.37 0.23 0.14 0.22 0.13 -0.58 0.17 0.72 0.08 1.00
PEN -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.16 0.05 -0.09 -0.16 0.00 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.24 0.19 0.18 1.00
Source: Authors’ computation, 2017, based on Stata version 14 outputs
Regression Results
The regression results are presented in the Table 4 and Table 5 accompanied by other 
relevant tests. From Table 4, it is evident that majority of the CAMELS indicators 
and other variables influence significantly bank’s financial soundness measured by 
TCAR and T1CR. While GRR, NPL/GL, LTA, MKR1 and AGE influence signifi-
cantly as hypothesised, the results of SIZE and SIM are against the expectation. 
Basically, capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity, sensitivity to market risk, bank’s 
size and systematically important status predict bank’s financial soundness equally 
regardless of its measure. Although CIR and ROA produce the expected sign, their 
insignificance is an indication of no empirical evidence for their relevance within the 
sampled period. These findings are consistent with the findings of Männasoo and 
Mayes (2005), Aktas et al. (2015), Duqi and Al-Tamimi (2017) and Kalifa and Bektaş 
(2018) except for CIR and ROA. There is also an agreement between the findings of 
this study and that of Bahadori et al. (2015) except for measures of liquidity whose in-
fluence was insignificant as found by Bahadori et al. (2015). Some level of agreement 
is also observable between the findings of this study and those of Aspal and Nazneen 
(2014) except for the influence of measure of management soundness on banks’ finan-
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cial soundness proxied by TCAR. However, this study disagrees with the findings of 
Whalen and Thomson (1988) except for non-performing loan ratio and Abdelrahim 
(2013) except for measures of liquidity and size.
With adjusted R2 >0.9 for both models, Table 4 further reveals that substantial chang-
es in banks’ financial soundness as measured by TCAR and T1CR are better ex-
plained by CAMELS indicators and other variables. This is espoused by the results 
of root mean squared error (RMSE), the standard deviation of the regression whose 
closeness to zero suggests a better fit of the model (Torres-Reyna, 2007b). The RMSE 
for both regression models with the first set of independent variables using TCAR 
and T1CR are 0.04 and 0.03 respectively. With F-stat having p<0.05, there is enough 
evidence of statistically significant relationship between bank’s financial soundness 
and all the explanatory variables. There is some degree of heteroscedasticity in the 
model with TCAR as a measure of financial soundness based on the results of Breus-
ch-Pagan Cook-Weisberg (BP-CW1 & BP-CW2) which are significant at p<0.05. 
Thus robust standard errors are added to the model.
Table 4: Regression Estimates with First Set of Independent Variables
Dependent Variable =TCAR (OLS) Dependent Variable = T1CR (OLS) VIF Analysis
Variable Coefficient t P value Coefficient t P value VIF 1/VIF
GRR 0.1561* 4.72 0.000 0.1571* 9.20 0.000 9.57 0.1045
NPL/GL -0.1761** -2.22 0.030 -0.1303** -2.18 0.033 5.67 0.1762
CIR -0.0296 -1.00 0.323 0.0049 0.17 0.863 7.21 0.1388
ROA 0.1111 0.15 0.878 0.7167 1.15 0.257 8.54 0.1171
LTA 0.0952** 2.15 0.035 0.0746** 2.20 0.032 1.73 0.5794
MKR1 -0.7263** -2.19 0.033 -0.6155*** -1.92 0.059 2.34 0.4271
SIZE -0.0355** -2.04 0.045 -0.0253** -2.06 0.043 6.59 0.1518
AGE 0.0261* 3.72 0.000 0.0112** 2.08 0.042 1.33 0.7522
SIM -0.0258*** -1.77 0.081 -0.0199*** -1.81 0.075 2.89 0.3466
PEN 0.0017 0.78 0.438 0.0004 0.23 0.821 1.33 0.7534









Source: Authors’ computation, 2017, based on Stata version 14 outputs, where *, ** and *** stand for significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Hausman tests (HausM) and tests of heteroscedasticity (BP-CW1 & BP-CW2) report 
chi-square values while F-stat report F-values with p-values in parentheses.
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Using the second set of independent variables (Table 5), CAMELS’ indicators 
also show significant effect on the bank’s financial soundness to a larger extent. 
While LVR, ROE and LTD predict bank’s financial soundness measured by TCAR 
as hypothesised, the significant impact of RTA is contrary to expectation. Two of the 
control variables, SIZE and AGE, significantly explain changes in bank’s financial 
condition except that the influence of SIZE is a reversal of prior expectation. The first 
five of the components of CAMELS have significant impact on the bank’s financial 
soundness when it is measured by T1CR except that the impact of RTA (a measure 
of management quality) is against the prior expectation. The results of diagnostic 
tests are in tandem with similar scenario applicable to the models with the first set of 
independent variables regarding adjusted R2 (adj.R2>0.9), F-stat (p<0.05) and RMSE 
(being closer to zero) as evident in the models in Table 5. Also, there is no any evi-
dence of the presence of heteroscedasticity based on the results of BP-CW1 and BP-
CW2 for both models. 
The empirical results depicted in Table 5 substantially agree with the findings of 
Bahadori et al. (2015) with the exception of indicators of liquidity and profitability. 
With capital adequacy, asset quality, and earnings ability having substantial explan-
atory power, there is also an agreement between the findings of this study and those 
of Bateni et al. (2014), Mayes and Stremmel (2014) and Duqi and Al-Tamimi (2017). 
The significant explanatory power of ROE on TCAR and T1CR as found in this study 
agrees with empirical evidence provided by Kalifa and Bektaş (2018). The previous 
studies of Duqi and Al-Tamimi (2017) and Kalifa and Bektaş (2018) align with the 
inverse relationship between size and banks’ financial soundness as found in this 
study. On the other hand, this study disagrees with the findings of Abdelrahim (2013) 
but agrees on the impact of measures of liquidity and size.
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Table 5: Regression Estimates with Second Set of Independent Variables
Dependent Variable =TCAR (OLS) Dependent Variable = T1CR (OLS) VIF Analysis
Variable Coefficient t p value Coefficient t p value VIF 1/VIF
LVR 1.0764* 17.8 0.000 1.0294* 21.82 0.000 2.09 0.4775
LLP/NIR -0.0132 -0.42 0.678 -0.0417*** -1.69 0.095 2.36 0.4232
RTA -1.1852* -3.42 0.001 -0.6472** -2.39 0.020 2.74 0.3644
ROE 0.0400* 4.44 0.000 0.0225* 3.20 0.002 1.48 0.6742
LTD 0.0951* 3.50 0.001 0.0735* 3.46 0.001 1.52 0.6571
MKR2 0.0044 0.15 0.882 0.0275 1.18 0.241 1.36 0.7330
SIZE -0.0303** -2.59 0.012 -0.0099 -1.09 0.282 4.59 0.2180
AGE 0.0188* 3.09 0.003 0.0047 1.00 0.321 1.3 0.7676
SIM -0.0093 -0.79 0.431 -0.0082 -0.89 0.377 2.51 0.3989
PEN 0.0008 0.46 0.646 -0.0010 -0.80 0.424 1.15 0.8682
_cons 0.7269* 2.99 0.004 0.2958 1.56 0.124 Mean VIF = 2.11 
R2 0.9372 0.9580
Adj.R2 0.9269 0.9512






Source: Authors’ computation, 2017, based on Stata version 14 outputs, where *, ** and *** stand for significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Hausman tests (HausM) and tests of heteroscedasticity (BP-CW1 & BP-CW2) report 
chi-square values while F-stat report F-values with p-values in parentheses.
Conclusions
This study, which seeks to examine the extent of the influence of CAMELS frame-
work on the financial soundness of DMBs in Nigeria, is borne out of the need to 
alert the investing public and depositors as well as influencing some regulatory over-
hauls. The financial soundness is measured by two variables: total regulatory capital 
(TCAR) and core capital (T1CR) ratios; while each of the CAMELS’ components is 
also represented by two variables. The empirical findings of this study, using pooled 
OLS, establish the explanatory powers of the CAMELS framework most especially 
in the prediction of Nigerian DMBs’ financial soundness according to Basel’s stan-
dards. Specifically, using the first set of the measures of CAMELS adopted regard-
less of whether total regulatory capital (TCAR) or Tier 1 capital (T1CR) is adopted 
as a measure of financial soundness, gross revenue ratio (capital adequacy), non-per-
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forming loans ratio (asset quality), liquid asset to total asset (liquidity), and interest 
expenses to total deposit (sensitivity to market risk) are effective in the determina-
tion of DMBs’ financial soundness within the sampled period. For the second set of 
the measures of CAMELS framework, all the components, except the sensitivity to 
market risk, exhibit the significant predictive potential of banks’ financial soundness. 
Also, bank’s size and age are better predictors but with the influence of size being 
significantly negative. It is equally evident that systematically important status has 
inverse relationship with Nigerian DMBs’ soundness measured by total risk-weighted 
and Tier 1 capital as obtained from the first model.
Based on these findings, it is evident that both gross revenue ratio and leverage 
ratio are good predictors of DMBs’ CAR. This lends credence to the introduction 
of leverage ratio by Basel III. It is also concluded that as the non-performing loans/
loan loss provisions build up, banks appear to be unsound given the reduction in the 
total regulatory capital and Tier 1 or core capital. It can also be inferred that ROE 
is a better predictor of banks’ financial soundness than ROA given its significant 
explanatory potential of CAR as hypothesised. There is also empirical support for 
the non-workability of the systematically important status of DMBs which is based 
substantially on the size of these banks.
These findings are pointers to the need for an overhauling of the bank regulatory 
system through a review of the systematically important status in such a way that it 
becomes a dependable predictor of Nigerian DMBs’ financial soundness as indicated 
by regulatory capital adequacy ratio. Alternatively, the approach may be suspended 
if it continues to fail to accomplish its set objectives. It is imperative for DMBs to 
reduce the build-up of their non-performing loans in order to improve their financial 
health. The reversal of the prior expectations of the asset turnover- a measure of 
management soundness requires further investigation by CBN. The investors and de-
positors alike require an in-depth understanding of the workings of all the indicators 
of CAMELS framework to make better informed decisions. Nevertheless, since there 
are several accounting measures of each of the components of CAMELS framework 
(Klomp & Haan, 2012), future studies particularly in the Nigerian context require a 
factor analysis of these indicators before a choice of those with higher factor load-
ings is made and their impact established. This study stands out among other related 
studies (see, for example, Echekoba, Egbunike & Ezu, 2014; Iheanyi & Sotonye, 2017; 
Owoputi, Kayode & Adeyefa, 2014) for measuring capital adequacy using leverage 
and gross revenue ratios and for including sensitivity to market risk in the study’s 
model particularly in the Nigerian context.
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